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Abstract—In this paper, we propose a new protocol for
the key establishment without any prior trust relationship
between an UE and a Machine Type Communication
(MTC) device, building security from 5G towards the IoT.
We use the protocol with ProSe to increase 5G coverage
and propose a new secure operating mode that has the
potential to save energy and bandwidth by securing direct
sessions between UEs and MTC devices.
I. INTRODUCTION
In [1], a projection related to 5G and the Internet of
Things (IoT) predicts 29 billion connected devices by
2022. Fom this number, 18 billion will be related to the
IoT. Connected devices include cars, machines, meters,
sensors, point-of-sales terminals, consumer electronics
and wearables. By the same year, a worldwide total of
6.2 billion (all different) mobile subscribers will hold
a total of 9 billion subscriptions. With these predictions
for IoT devices and subscribers, the connections between
devices is expected to increase within IoT networks or
in interaction with other types of equipment.
For direct connections between User Equipments
(UEs), 3GPP has standardized Device-to-Device (D2D)
communications naming them Proximity Services
(ProSe) [2]. For Machine Type Communications (MTC),
it has released the recommendations for security mecha-
nisms [3]. In the MTC category, the architectural model
consists of a client, the MTC device (MTCd), and a MTC
Server (MTCs) that is responsible for the security of a
group of MTCd. The MTCs can also store particular
information sent from each MTCd under its control [3].
This operational mode doesn’t account for volatile data
or actions that don’t need to be recorded and increases, in
a general way, the latency. It compels a user who needs
information from a group of MTCd or wants to interact
with them, to run a security procedure with MTCs to
get needed data, through a Base Station (BS). MTCd
are expected to authenticate to a MTCs and send their
data or receive commands from it. In parallel, a user
carrying a UE and authorized to interact with certain
MTCd, also needs to authenticate to MTCs. After this
procedure is complete, the interaction between MTCd
and UEs runs through the MTCs, rather than directly, in
a D2D fashion. The MTCs is a participant in the user
plane (UP) data flow, which adds energy and bandwidth
consumption. As an example, using the simplified path-
loss model [4] with a reference distance d0 = 10m,
constant L = 4.38 × 10−8 and γ = 3, and comparing
losses for communication distances, e.g., 20m for D2D
and 300m for a cellular link, we see that a D2D link has
a loss roughly 3425 times inferior than a cellular link.
In the 3GPP architecture the MTC UP data is required
to flow through a server beyond the BS to reach back
to an UE. There is always a direct connection between
the MTCd or a gateway (GW) to a BS, without room
for cooperation schemes that could allow for reduced
power transmissions and bigger coverage area. If we
equate mobility of the MTCd, as in any moving vehicles,
devices installed in moving parts or even wearables, we
see that MTCd communicating directly with a BS can
have a very high cost in terms of power. Some devices
will simply suffer from power depletion. However, if
they could directly connect to another device for their
routine interactions, the power saved could be significant.
Therefore we see an opportunity to shorten com-
munication distance, using the potential of the ProSe
functionality. We look at the numbers estimated for the
IoT, mobile subscriptions and scenarios in smart cities
and Public Protection and Disaster Relief (PPDR) use
cases and foresee a bigger number of interactions UE-
MTCd, many times higher than the number of deployed
devices. These connections need to be secure, even if just
to guarantee the integrity of the messages exchanged.
Therefore the number of end-to-end pairwise keys is,
regardless of the technique used, bigger than the number
of users interacting with other devices.
Therefore, in this work, we focus on the key establish-
ment for connections between UEs and MTCd and aim at
reducing the communication costs of these connections
by taking advantage of proximity and the ProSe standard
(that cannot be used with resource constrained devices),
and present a lightweight key distribution scheme. We
account for service authorization and authentication of
all participating devices, MTCd, UEs or GWs. Specifi-
cally, we propose a protocol for mutual authentication of
a MTCd and a MTCs using an UE as a relay. At the same
time, the MTCd and the UE establish a symmetric master978-1-5386-3531-5/17/$31.00 c© 2017 IEEE
key. This allows them to communicate directly, making it
possible for the MTCs not to participate in the UP data
flow. We present also a cooperation scheme based on
the proposed protocol that extends 5G coverage towards
MTCd. The main contributions of this paper are: 1) we
provide a method to distribute a shared secret between
each MTCd and an UE that wishes to communicate
with them. The key pair is symmetric, respecting the
resource constrained nature of MTCd. 2) Our method
provides authentication and authorization services of all
participating devices. 3) The proposed solution is able to
resist to known attacks. We used the automatic protocol
formal verification tool ProVerif to prove our protocol’s
security. 4) Our solution limits the communication range
of MTCd or a GW to an UE in proximity, rather than
a BS. It also removes the MTCs from the UP data flow
to save energy in the MTCd, the UEs and in the overall
5G network.
Section II presents related work. Section III describes
our system model. Our solution an its extension are
reported in section IV. Security and performance evalu-
ation are discussed in section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
The coverage extension possibilities opened by the
ProSe standard are not well explored. ProSe offers a
way to offload some communications away from the
BSs. As for UEs, the standard is clear now but MTC
communications are still not well defined and have room
for improvements. Although there are many solutions for
resource constrained devices for key establishment in IoT
environments [5], to the best of our knowledge, they do
not involve the ProSe standard in 5G. The cooperation
schemes for coverage extension in 5G are not abundant
either. The works mentioned in this section all relate to
5G, establishing D2D security or authenticating MTCd
to the Core Network. However, they all differ from our
solution, the only one providing security establishment
for UE and MTCd direct communications. Authors of
[6] propose a protocol for coverage extension where
UEs in coverage of a BS serve as anchors to MTCd
to send their data. A set of key indexes is advertised by
UEs to devices outside coverage expecting they share
at least one key with the sender. If there is no shared
key, connection is not established. For this, we define
the scheme as a probabilistic key establishment scheme.
Reference [7] proposes a cooperation scheme that allows
for coverage extension based on a coalition of UEs that
cooperate and decide whether to accept or not to start a
direct link connection with another device. This proposal
relies on certificates and an asymmetric cryptosystem,
generally considered computationally heavy for resource
constrained MTCd. Work reported in [8] addresses au-
thenticating MTCd towards MTCs and provides mutual
authentication between MTCd and MTCs. However, this
solution does not consider the possibility of expanding
coverage or direct communication with the MTCd. It
needs 6 messages to authenticate devices with LTE
radio capabilities, requires grouping the MTCd together,
sharing a group key.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We now describe the considered system model. The
participants involved are UEs, MTCd, GWs and MTCs,
whether it is part of the 3GPP network or not [3]. Fig.
1 shows the considered network architecture.
Fig. 1: System Model
We consider as an UE any device that has, amongst
others, 5G and LTE radio interfaces and is usually held
and controlled by a person. MTCd are generally devices
with low power radio technologies like the ones based on
IEEE 802.15.4, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, etc., and may have 5G
and LTE radio interfaces. Regardless of their embedded
radio interfaces, we consider them to be resource con-
strained in terms of computational capabilities, memory
space and battery capacity and to be equipped with
Machine Type Communication capabilities [3]. GWs are
devices that can serve as a radio GW for a cluster of
MTCd in their vicinity. The GW role is to receive infor-
mation from MTCd, and send the information through
a more powerful, LTE or 5G radio channel, to a BS.
The MTCs is the element that is assigned a number of
MTCd, and that is responsible for the security of these
devices and/or storing their data.
IV. OUR PROPOSED PROTOCOL
We describe our protocol, the messages and their
content, as well as our solution security features and
use the notation shown in table I. We propose to use our
protocol, that has initialization and key exchange phases,
for an IoT coverage extension, using the ProSe standard.
TABLE I: NOTATION
Abbreviation Definition
PSKey Pre shared key
DMKey Derived Master key
MIC Message Integrity Code
MTCdMIC MIC calculated by MTC device
MTCsMIC MIC calculated by MTC Server
MTCdID MTC device’s ID
MTCsID MTC server’s ID
UEID UE ID
GWID GW ID
MTCdNonce Nonce generated by MTC device
MTCsNonce Nonce generated by MTC server
KDF Key Derivation Function
MTCdInfo Information used by the device
MTCsInfo Information used by the server
|| Concatenation
A. Initialization phase
The initialization phase consists of pre-determined
conditions representing our assumptions for the protocol
to run properly. Namely, we consider the following:
• Each MTCd has at least one MTCs responsible
for security material distribution, authentication and
authorization of the MTCd assigned to it;
• Each MTCd has a pre shared secret key that is only
known to itself and to the MTCs it is assigned to;
• Each MTCd is assigned with an unique ID inside
its own MTCs cluster and knows its MTCs IDs;
• The UEs have access through a secure channel to
the MTCs under the 3GPP system responsibility;
• UEs communicating directly or with a GW, commu-
nicate using a private channel established according
to ProSe [9].
We also assume that an MTCd can start communi-
cation with another device and indicate that its radio
channel evaluation is out of the scope of this work.
B. Key exchange phase
In the key exchange phase, the protocol is simply
composed of 4 messages and is represented in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2: Authentication protocol
We describe the four messages in more detail:
Message 1: MTCd generates MTCdNonce (for
freshness of the message) and uses it with PSKey,
MTCdInfo and the IDs of the participants in the
protocol to calculate MTCdMIC keyed with PSKey. In
this way, the IDs of all participants in the routing path
are binded to mitigate the risk of spoofing attacks.
MTCdMIC =MIC(PSKey,MTCdID,MTCsID,
UEID,MTCdNonce,MTCdInfo)
MTCdInfo may contain information about the UE/GW
ID connecting to MTCd, contextual information (e.g.,
location) or any other that the MTCd needs to send
to MTCs, as for example related to the cryptographic
algorithms supported (e.g., MIC algorithm, KDF
function) or its current status (e.g., battery level). We
do not advocate any particular algorithm for MTCdMIC
calculation although we would follow the recommended
in [10], [11]. MTCd then computes and sends to the UE:
M1 =MTCdID||MTCsID||MTCdNonce||UEID||
[MTCdInfo]||MTCdMIC
Message 2: When the UE receives M1, it simply
forwards it to the MTCs with identity MTCsID.
Message 3: Upon reception of M2, MTCs can check
the UE’s service authorization with the Core Network.
Therefore, mutual authentication between MTCs and
UE can take place (e.g., using TLS/SSL). Then, it
verifies MTCdMIC using the PSKey and the elements
in M2. If the challenge was correctly answered by the
MTCd, its authentication in MTCs is completed. It then
generates MTCsNonce and calculates its own MIC:
MTCsMIC =MIC(MTCdID,MTCsID,
MTCdNonce,MTCsNonce, UEID,MTCdInfo,
MTCsInfo, PSKey)
MTCsNonce and IDs are used again for the novelty of
M3 and to bind IDs. MTCs then generates DMKey:
DMKey = KDF (MTCdID,MTCsID,
MTCdNonce,MTCsNonce, UEID,PSKey)
MTCs then computes and sends to the UE:
M3 =MTCsID||MTCdID||MTCsNonce||
UEID||[MTCsInfo]||MTCsMIC||DMKey
MTCsInfo can be useful if the MTCs wants to select a
particular KDF, or to limit the actions of a user towards
the specific MTCd in terms of usage type, duration and
DMKey expiration/revocation. We leave it as an open
topic for MTCs policy. We do not advocate the use of
any specific KDF. The MTCs should be able to select
the best option for the related MTCd. However, we
advocate the KDF recommendations in [12].
Message 4: When the UE receives M3 from MTCs it
extracts, stores and deletes DMKey from the message.
By receiving DMKey, the UE has the implicit indication
that the MTCd has been successfully authenticated. It
then sends to the MTCd:
M4 =MTCsID||MTCdID||MTCsNonce||UEID
||[MTCsInfo]||MTCsMIC
Upon reception, the MTCd uses these elements to verify
MTCsMIC. If the verification is successful, the MTCd
authenticates the MTCs and the mutual authentication
process is complete. It then computes DMkey:
DMKey = KDF (MTCdID,MTCsID,
MTCdNonce,MTCsNonce, UEID,PSKey)
After the protocol is executed, the MTCd also implicitly
authenticates UEs as they now both share a DMKey,
a shared secret key that can be used to derive further
confidentiality or integrity protection keys. This solution
can act as the underlying mechanism for ProSe, using
the methods described in [9] to derive further keys.
C. Protocol extension
We now consider in our scenario the addition of
another UE in proximity of a group of MTCd or a
GW. A user needing to connect to one or more MTCd
can request the connection establishment to their ProSe
links, UEs or GWs. If it doesn’t have any ProSe pair,
ProSe discovery request can start as defined in [2].
We advocate that ProSe Direct Discovery and Direct
Communication concepts [2] can be used between an
UE and a GW for cooperation and coverage extension.
After this connection is established, the UE/GW try to
access the MTCd the user requested. If so, the protocol
proposed in the previous section is executed, with one
more actor, the second UE or a GW. Fig. 3 ilustrates
the extended version of the protocol. In addition to the
Fig. 3: Extended authentication protocol
messages defined and explained in section IV, we now
add two more messages, M2 and M6. They are however
the same as described before, only the new UE or GW
is forwarding them to the correct destination. This is a
way to use the ProSe standard to leverage the coverage
of the 5G network.
V. SECURITY EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS
In this section we evaluate the security properties of
our solution. Our security analysis is built based on
Dolev-Yao threat model. Our protocol is fully compliant
with all the security requirements of 3GPP [9]. A trust
relation is built between all elements as the protocol runs.
ProVerif [13] was used to test the authentication and
secrecy properties of our protocol. After representing
it with this tool, we queried the secrecy of DMkey,
the authentication of the MTCd by the MTCs and vice
versa. We obtained positive results for all 3 queries. We
proved therefore, the secrecy and mutual authentication
properties of our solution. Our metrics for security
evaluation are symmetry of the keys, if the scheme is
probabilistic or deterministic and if it is server assisted.
Confidentiality and integrity of the messages, authentica-
tion, authorization, freshness of messages and resilience
to attacks are also evaluated. Our solution uses a sym-
metric key scheme to account for limitations of MTCd.
It is deterministic by design and relies on the MTCs to
assist the key establishment. Messages exchanged can
have confidentiality and integrity by means of the shared
DMKey. The authentication is mutual and explicit for
the MTCd-MTCs pair by verification of the MICs. It is
mutual for the pairs UE-MTCs. They trust each other as
their secure channel was previously established by the
3GPP system. It is mutual and implicit for MTCd-UE
pair, the moment their symmetric keys are established,
because when MTCd verifies MTCsMIC, it means the
MTCs trusted the UE. Authorization can be checked
for all participants. MTCs is responsible for authorizing
MTCd as per its own policy and to check with the Core
Network if the UEs and GWs are authorized to establish
the connections. MTCdNonce and MTCsNonce mitigate
replay attacks. Finally, our solution is resilient to attacks
due to the use of pairwise keys so compromising one
node does not compromise the whole network.
VI. PERFORMANCE
We now evaluate security metrics and performance
of our solution and compare them with works [6], [7],
[8]. We evaluate works as deterministic or probabilistic
for key establishment procedures. In [6], a probabilistic
scheme is proposed and probabilities for key establish-
ment are presented. The authentication is via a coalition
of UEs in [7] and in both [7] and [6] servers are not
involved. In [6], the server is also not required for
communication establishment. In this sense, we describe
these proposals as providing implicit authentication. In
both our solution and in [8], there is support for au-
thorization and explicit mutual authentication between
MTCd and MTCs. In our proposal, MTCdInfo and
MTCsInfo are reserved to use to limit the access for
certain data or application type, access time, or any other
information that suits their needs or policies. Finally, we
show the Server is a necessary actor in our proposal
as in [8] so that the MTCd are authenticated and the
protocols executed. Table II summarizes the qualitative
comparison assessment of the security features.
TABLE II: SECURITY METRICS COMPARISON
Key esta-
blishment Authentication
Authori-
sation
Server
assistance
[7] Deter-ministic
Coalition of devices
implicitly autheticates
the new member.
Not
specified
Not
needed
[6] Proba-bilistic
Implicit authentication
by having a common key
Not
specified
Not
needed
[8] Deter-ministic
Explicit and mutual
for MTCd-GW Supported Needed
Our Deter-ministic
Explicit and mutual
for MTCd-MTCs
Implicit and mutual
for MTCd-GW
Supported Needed
We evaluate performance in terms of number of
messages necessary for key distribution, computational
effort required to run it and memory requirements.
Our proposal needs four messages to be executed. The
cooperation scheme adds two more messages, but they
are simply forwarded from one UE to another UE/GW,
without extra computations. The MICs and nonces pro-
vide explicit mutual authentication and mitigate replay
attacks. MTCsInfo allows MTCs to be able to choose a
suitable KDF and to restrict the usage of the MTCd, as
per its policy. Therefore we conclude that the elements
in the messages are the minimum possible to guarantee
these security properties. Symmetric key cryptosystems
are well suited for resource constrained MTCd. The
KDF executed in the server side and the key delivered
to the UE, eliminates the need for the latter to make
computations. The MICs are calculated in a standard,
recommended way [10], [11] and therefore, the compu-
tational cost is normal. The MTCs can choose the KDF
from the recommended ones in MTCsInfo. This can be
very useful for the MTCd as the MTCs can, for example,
select a suitable KDF to generate DMKey. Therefore, we
evaluate the computational costs and computing power
as minimum to garantee robust security features.
As for memory, some bytes are needed to store keys.
The nonces require some more bytes to store previously
used values but in very constrained MTCd, they can be
replaced by counters. The MTCs needs to maintain a
database linking MTCd IDs with the PSKey, DMKey
and nonces but memory shouldn’t be a problem at a
server level. The power consumed in communications
can be reduced after the D2D connection is established.
It can reduce congestion risk if the interaction is with
several MTCd at the same time. The scalability may be
affected for a big number of MTCd but as the protocol
relies on proximity, this is not foreseen as a problem.
We compare our proposal with the works mentioned
in II. We evaluate the performance in terms of the
main energy spending contributors: CPU usage, memory
usage and numbers of messages Tx/Rx. Our proposal
requires less messages exchanged, provides all the mod-
ern security features and complies with 3GPP standards
[9]. To better demonstrate the benefits for MTCd in
power savings, both after the D2D connection is built
and during its establishment, we look at these metrics
from the point of view of the MTCd. It is worth to
mention that, to the best of our knowledge, there is
no other proposal for direct MTCd-UE communications.
In [8], a protocol to authenticate a group of MTCd is
proposed. To make a proper comparison, we assume their
protocol authenticating one MTCd. Table III summarizes
the comparison of the four proposals in terms of the
mentioned performance.
TABLE III: PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
CPU usage Memory usage Messages Tx/Rx
[7]
High
Assymetric
cryptosystem
High
Use of certificates
Messages exchan-
ged on demand:
minimum 3
[6]
Low
Symmetric
cryptosystem
(Computes key
verification)
High
use of key rings
(higher the number
of keys, higher
the probability)
Messages sent
periodically:
every 10ms
[8]
Low Symmetric
cryptosystem
(Computes
MICs and KDFs)
Low: 1 PSKey,
1 Group Key,
1 Derived Key (per
pair MTCd-server)
Messages
exchanged
on demand: 4
Our
Low Symmetric
cryptosystem
(Computes
MICs and KDFs)
Low: 1 PSKey,
1 Derived Key (per
pair MTCd-UE)
Messages
exchanged
on demand: 2
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we present a protocol for authentica-
tion and establishment of secure sessions between UEs
and MTC devices without any prior trust. We rely on
cryptographic systems that respect the nature of resource
constrained MTCd and guarantee important security
features. Our proposal eliminates the need of MTCd
or GWs sending data to a server, saving significant
amounts of energy, bandwidth and reducing latency. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first solution for
this direct interaction in 5G and IoT. We introduce the
ProSe standard to enhance the coverage of 5G by means
of interaction between two UEs, or one UE and a GW
and prove the security of our solution. We advocate
this operating mode since it is extremely efficient for
coverage extension, saves energy and bandwidth. Our
solution is relevant and useful for PPDR scenarios, where
UEs may play a key role in maintaining communications,
and smart city scenarios where volatile type interactions
often take place.
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